Do Not Redeem #2
Kitler says he didn’t request that OTP, neither did he read or share it. So it must be the scammer at play. Can you figure out the package name of the application that the suspected scammer used to infiltrate Kitler? Wrap your answer within
KashiCTF{
and}
.
Flag format: KashiCTF{com.example.pacage.name}
Download kitler's-phone.tar.gz
: Use the same file as in the challenge description of forensics/Do Not Redeem #1
by savsch
Since we already had the OTP timestamp from Do Not Redeem #1 (1740251865569
), we searched for files modified around that time.
$ find . -type f -newermt '2025-02-23 03:13:00 +08' ! -newermt '2025-02-23 03:14:00 +08' -ls
2814749767397922 8 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 5067 Feb 23 03:13 ./data/data/com.google.android.apps.messaging/cache/image_manager_disk_cache/85b688c1ee5638219d67340e8e5741781c29c85ec2943a8379748fca219be0d7.0
2814749767397921 12 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 9095 Feb 23 03:13 ./data/data/com.google.android.apps.messaging/cache/image_manager_disk_cache/dd76d270a52ddf07e3a4d062dab37a141a045b63cb2b4af19c8ef38cbc0400da.0
2814749767397920 12 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 9095 Feb 23 03:13 ./data/data/com.google.android.apps.messaging/cache/image_manager_disk_cache/e6e2689908af53b2b282c76df41fe10b12a8c0895e3e3c39d1b4513c8fe756c9.0
3096224744108828 4 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 4096 Feb 23 03:13 ./data/data/com.google.android.apps.messaging/databases/gnp_fcm_database
2814749767397965 0 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 99 Feb 23 03:13 ./data/data/com.google.android.apps.messaging/files/AccountData.pb
2814749767398035 0 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 39 Feb 23 03:13 ./data/data/com.google.android.apps.messaging/files/DefaultAccountData.pb
3940649674232136 0 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 230 Feb 23 03:13 ./data/system/appops/discrete/1740251606675tl
3377699720810545 4 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 1257 Feb 23 03:13 ./data/system/dropbox/[email protected]
3377699720811639 8 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 6467 Feb 23 03:13 ./data/system_ce/0/shortcut_service/bitmaps/com.google.android.apps.messaging/1740251633185.png
6473924464629415 8 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 5067 Feb 23 03:13 ./data/user/0/com.google.android.apps.messaging/cache/image_manager_disk_cache/85b688c1ee5638219d67340e8e5741781c29c85ec2943a8379748fca219be0d7.0
2814749767390886 12 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 9095 Feb 23 03:13 ./data/user/0/com.google.android.apps.messaging/cache/image_manager_disk_cache/dd76d270a52ddf07e3a4d062dab37a141a045b63cb2b4af19c8ef38cbc0400da.0
2814749767390885 12 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 9095 Feb 23 03:13 ./data/user/0/com.google.android.apps.messaging/cache/image_manager_disk_cache/e6e2689908af53b2b282c76df41fe10b12a8c0895e3e3c39d1b4513c8fe756c9.0
2814749767391026 4 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 4096 Feb 23 03:13 ./data/user/0/com.google.android.apps.messaging/databases/gnp_fcm_database
2814749767390912 0 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 99 Feb 23 03:13 ./data/user/0/com.google.android.apps.messaging/files/AccountData.pb
2814749767390950 0 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 39 Feb 23 03:13 ./data/user/0/com.google.android.apps.messaging/files/DefaultAccountData.pb
2814749767397022 4 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 32768 Feb 23 03:13 ./data/user_de/0/com.android.providers.blockednumber/databases/blockednumbers.db
3096224744107679 0 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 0 Feb 23 03:13 ./data/user_de/0/com.android.providers.blockednumber/databases/blockednumbers.db-journal
3940649674246673 8 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 5067 Feb 23 03:13 ./data_mirror/data_ce/null/0/com.google.android.apps.messaging/cache/image_manager_disk_cache/85b688c1ee5638219d67340e8e5741781c29c85ec2943a8379748fca219be0d7.0
1970324837272080 12 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 9095 Feb 23 03:13 ./data_mirror/data_ce/null/0/com.google.android.apps.messaging/cache/image_manager_disk_cache/dd76d270a52ddf07e3a4d062dab37a141a045b63cb2b4af19c8ef38cbc0400da.0
3940649674246671 12 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 9095 Feb 23 03:13 ./data_mirror/data_ce/null/0/com.google.android.apps.messaging/cache/image_manager_disk_cache/e6e2689908af53b2b282c76df41fe10b12a8c0895e3e3c39d1b4513c8fe756c9.0
2814749767404188 4 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 4096 Feb 23 03:13 ./data_mirror/data_ce/null/0/com.google.android.apps.messaging/databases/gnp_fcm_database
1970324837272106 0 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 99 Feb 23 03:13 ./data_mirror/data_ce/null/0/com.google.android.apps.messaging/files/AccountData.pb
2814749767404112 0 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 39 Feb 23 03:13 ./data_mirror/data_ce/null/0/com.google.android.apps.messaging/files/DefaultAccountData.pb
4503599627675440 4 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 32768 Feb 23 03:13 ./data_mirror/data_de/null/0/com.android.providers.blockednumber/databases/blockednumbers.db
4222124650964785 0 -rwxrwxrwx 1 ztz ztz 0 Feb 23 03:13 ./data_mirror/data_de/null/0/com.android.providers.blockednumber/databases/blockednumbers.db-journal
This revealed files related to:
- Google Messages (
com.google.android.apps.messaging
) - Blocked Numbers Provider (
com.android.providers.blockednumber
) - Dropbox Logs (
data/system/dropbox/
)
Among these, we found an app crash log at:
./data/system/dropbox/[email protected]
Upon inspecting it:
cat ./data/system/dropbox/[email protected]
SystemUptimeMs: 2856014
Process: com.google.calendar.android
PID: 8520
UID: 10211
Frozen: false
Flags: 0x28c8be44
Package: com.google.calendar.android v1 (1.0)
Foreground: No
Process-Runtime: 2263
Timestamp: 2025-02-23 00:43:33.942+0530
Build: google/sdk_gphone64_x86_64/emu64xa:15/AE3A.240806.005/12228598:userdebug/dev-keys
Crash-Handler: com.android.internal.os.RuntimeInit$KillApplicationHandler
Loading-Progress: 1.0
Dropped-Count: 0
java.lang.SecurityException: Writable dex file '/data/user/0/com.google.calendar.android/files/misc_config.dex' is not allowed.
at dalvik.system.DexFile.openDexFileNative(Native Method)
at dalvik.system.DexFile.openDexFile(DexFile.java:406)
at dalvik.system.DexFile.<init>(DexFile.java:128)
at dalvik.system.DexFile.<init>(DexFile.java:101)
at dalvik.system.DexPathList.loadDexFile(DexPathList.java:438)
at dalvik.system.DexPathList.makeDexElements(DexPathList.java:387)
at dalvik.system.DexPathList.<init>(DexPathList.java:166)
at dalvik.system.BaseDexClassLoader.<init>(BaseDexClassLoader.java:160)
at dalvik.system.BaseDexClassLoader.<init>(BaseDexClassLoader.java:105)
at dalvik.system.DexClassLoader.<init>(DexClassLoader.java:55)
at f2.i.run(SourceFile:57)
at java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:1012)
This shows that com.google.calendar.android
attempted to execute a dex file, which is often used in malware to load additional code dynamically—this is suspicious behavior.
KashiCTF{com.google.calendar.android}